I tend to think in terms of a public forum in which the audience represents a spectrum of views. In polarized public debates, there’s a temptation to think of those making the argument on the other side as the audience, and when replying to them, to think in terms of persuading them. This may be hopeless — they’re the other pole — and isn’t usually the best objective. It’s better to think in terms of swaying the uncommitted.

I recall in the political blogosphere reading laments about how those people on the other side were hopeless — because the lamenter paid attention to the most visible people, which is to say, the most noisy and extreme and unreachable. Eric Hoffer had something to say about this.

I understand only interpreting natural phenomena in terms of natural processes, but who determines what is natural or supernatural? What if the beginning of the universe and of life were not natural phenomena, but were supernatural in nature? Should scientists try to explain supernatural phenomena in natural terms?

If scientific evidence would seem to indicate design or purpose for example, or perhaps that it could not have had a natural cause, if science were truly neutral in regards to the supernatural, should this type of dialog be censored from the classroom?

When discussing evolution with a creationist, it’s important to keep in mind several points:

1) They focus on the source of species. Any examples that shake up their concept of species are useful. For example, seagull species form an inter-breeding continuum around the world – but where the ends of the continuum overlap, the endpoints don’t interbreed. It may also be useful to talk about crossings between plant species and even genera, which are quite common – more so than in animals.

2) They probably have not thought much about the fact that their belief requires literal miracles. A useful approach is, “Science studies how things might work in the absence of miracles. If we can find a mechanism or process that does not require miracles, then it’s up to each person’s faith to decide whether miracles were involved anyway. But miracles are not within the purview of science.” It may take some time before they will even acknowledge that creationism requires miracles.

3) They know they are right. They may be trying to convert you, either to a belief in God’s creative acts, or (perhaps more likely these days) to a belief that the educational system is inappropriately teaching evolutionism. They may actually understand evolution reasonably well, but reject it nonetheless. Their reasons for rejection may be based on detailed argument, simple misinformation, rhetoric, or any combination of the above; in any case, reasoned argument with their statements will probably be inefficient.

4) With most creationists, this is more a matter of politics and/or faith than of science. Unless you can shake up their basic worldview (as by undermining the concept of species), or recast the discussion (for example, by defining miracles out of science), you will not get anywhere by talking scientifically.

5) They may have legitimate grievances against science. There’s a continuum between “Science studies how things would work without miracles” and “Scientists’ job is to convince people that the world is godless.” Scientists are scattered across this continuum. Thus, creationists have heard scientists tell their children that God does not exist… and they see evolution as a way to get anti-God propaganda into the schools. There are all sorts of subtleties here, and no obvious easy right answer.

Chris

Thanks for your thoughtful and valuable comments. I agree with several of your points, and I’ve revised the post to clarify what I intended to say, or perhaps, what I should have intended to say. In particular, I note that actively rejecting the term “theory of evolution” would be neither well-motivated intellectually, nor wise tactically, nor consistent with what I’ve suggested. I think you make the reasons for this very clear.

Re. education, yes, to the extent that the context is educational rather than confrontational, explaining the meaning of “theory” in science is valuable — not so much as a direct aid to anyone’s understanding of evolution, but as a contribution to their general knowledge of science.

Re. my closing example of other denial rhetoric and responses to it, thank you for pointing out the noxious way in which it could be read. I removed an avoidable hot-button word and appended a comment to clarify that I intended “a comparison of words, not of their speakers” and that the instances are in other respects not remotely similar.

Re. whether “the word ‘theory’ has the same logical meaning whether you’re talking physics or evolution” — I don’t object to (what I argue is) stretching the term “theory” to cover both, but I do see them as quite different at what is very much a logical level:

A universal physical theory that asserts “For all…” has a logical status fundamentally different from that of a biological theory that asserts “There exists…”, even if the assertion is “There exists an overwhelming prevalence of [some physical or causal pattern], and it seems to be universal for all life on Earth”. The first is falsifiable in a strong sense, eternally, because one can never examine “all”. A simple “There exists x” statement by contrast, is verifiable (“There exists x, and here’s a picture of x, and a sample of its hair”) but not falsifiable, provided that exhaustive observations are impossible. There’s muddy ground in this area, because a biologist can certainly assert falsifiable universals; I just don’t see them as central or necessary to the field.

Instead, I see the theoretical understanding of evolution as consisting of strong generalizations that describe what has been observed, or reasonably inferred, to exist, or to have happened, and the underlying causal mechanisms. I don’t see biologists as very concerned about the possibility that there may somewhere be things or phenomena that work in a way that their generalizations don’t cover (except as an opportunity for discovery that would add to, not overthrow, the present understanding). Physicists, by contrast, are intensely interested in just that, because their generalizations are of a kind that could be decisively overthrown by a phenomenon 13 billion years and light years distant.

(BTW, I take your point about the different nature of more mundane, less fundamental physics; lofty philosophical debates about The Nature of Scientific Theory very often neglect the patchwork and globally robust nature of most scientific knowledge.)

Re. Historical vs. current uses, yes, it’s a current term, and what I meant to say is that using it is absolutely unavoidable in discussing the history of ideas, since it is an integral part of that history. In the present, my view is that it is, at the moment, an integral part of discussions, at least, and that it is of-course-OK-to-use-but-unnecessary-and-good-to-deemphasize-but-wrong-to-reject (is there a word for that?).

On another note, I think it’s disingenuous to insinuate that the logic of principles in evolution is inconsistent with that of physical principles or that physics is an “exact science” in opposition to an “explanatory science.” Physical laws do not describe the body of our understanding of “physics”, physical theories do, and physical theories are both explanatory and generalized. Evolutionary science may be distinct in that the closest equivalent of a “law” is simply the fact that evolution happens, but the word “theory” has the same logical meaning whether you’re talking physics or evolution.

I also disagree with removing the phrase “Theory of Evolution” from the public discourse for a couple main reasons.

- Reactionary: “Theory” will continue to be used by denialists no matter how thorough an attempt is made by scientific advocates to “clean up” their own language. In this case, we are left in the dubious-looking position of discouraging the use of the term while being unable to actually make the argument that it is logically incorrect to use. The message this makes? “The theoretical status of evolution is an inconvenient fact for the evolutionists! You’re trying to censor it away!”

The reason you’re here making these points in the first place is that there is a manufactured “controversy” and it has two sides, one of which is diametrically opposed to you. It is necessary to consider their potential response.

-Educational: I fundamentally disagree with your separation of the “technical” and the “public/educational” on this issue. The solution is not to simply ignore the technical definition–if anything, what this is (and what it has been used for, in my experience) is a learning point on the use of “theory” in a scientific context. That’s a good thing! We don’t, say, need kids to encounter “the theory of special relativity” and assume that that means it must be dubious. “Theory” is going to pop up eventually when it comes to learning about science, it’s best that its use be understood.

Understanding the usage of “theory” is an important part of understanding scientific reasoning, which I hope we can agree is a powerful thing. I support more opportunities to make its meaning less opaque to the general public and, terrible as the existence of “controversy” around evolution in this country is, it provides a talking point for that.

“I don’t expect the term to go away, particularly in discussions of the history of ideas (where the term has played a central role), and in discussions of how the major theoretical concepts in evolution have evolved. “

“Theory” is not a historical term, it’s a current term. The theoretical status of evolution, as an association and explanation of phenomena, is not “historic” in the sense of being “a thing of the past.” “It was a theory, but it was right so it changed!” is a toxic misconception.

I’m going to tentatively agree with your statements about the use of the word “evidence” (which makes me cringe) with exception to the use of the holocaust as a point of reference, which I feel is disingenuous and offensive. I’d point to gravity instead: we know things fall. No one is sitting around letting things go and calling it “evidence.”

I’ve inserted a paragraph to clarify the limited scope of my recommendations and expectations re. “the theory of evolution”: the term is necessary in discussing the history of ideas, and can’t be expected to disappear from public discourse. I also emphasize the unnecessary difficulty of what is, as you say, surely possible — that is, to explain scientific knowledge of evolution despite labeling that knowledge with a term that means, in common use, the opposite of knowledge. I just think that it’s best to avoid the problem.

I’ve also revised a sentence to more clearly state what you correctly read as a reference to scientists’ (not the public’s) lack of interest in finding “evidence for evolution”. I do think that that vivid and compelling evidence be presented to the public, but as “information about” rather than “evidence for”. This better reflects the status of knowledge and inquiry in the area. There’s ample evidence for the existence of China today, and Rome in the past, but it would seem silly to call it that.

Note that people who speak of “evidence for the Holocaust” are either deniers, or (I would argue) have been lured into playing their game. The deniers should be answered, perhaps by mentioning the essential facts as part of a broader story of historical genocide before, during, and after the slaughter of Jews and millions others, including Gypsies and Soviet prisoners of war (Holocaust Museum Encyclopedia). The story is stronger than any part, and the parts share the strength of the story. To use the deniers’ term, “evidence”, though, would be to frame the historical fact as questionable. Likewise with evolution.

[In response to the comment below, I should note that the preceding example came to mind as a familiar and vivid (on reflection, perhaps too vivid) illustration of a parallel between patterns of language in argumentation, and only that: a comparison of words, not of their speakers. The moral and political dimensions of the content of the arguments are of course not remotely comparable.]